Shadows and Light: Addressing Information Asymmetries through Enhanced Social Disclosure in Canadian Securities Law by Dhir, Aaron A.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
2009 
Shadows and Light: Addressing Information Asymmetries through 
Enhanced Social Disclosure in Canadian Securities Law 
Aaron A. Dhir 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, adhir@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Source Publication: 
Canadian Business Law Journal. Volume 47, Issue 3 (2009), p. 435-468. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Dhir, Aaron A. "Shadows and Light: Addressing Information Asymmetries through Enhanced Social 
Disclosure in Canadian Securities Law." Canadian Business Law Journal 47.3 (2009): 435-468. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital 
Commons. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263925
SHADOWS AND LIGHT: ADDRESSING INFORMATION
ASYMMETRIES THROUGH ENHANCED SOCIAL
DISCLOSURE IN CANADIAN SECURITIES LAW
Aaron A. Dhir*
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 2005, the InvestmentDealersAssociation of Canada
sponsored a comprehensive review ofCanadian securities regulation
with a view towards modernizing the legislative framework and
improving the effectiveness of our capitalmarkets. TheFinalReport
of the “Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada”
was released inOctober 2006.1The 65 recommendations set forth are
the product of 30 research papers prepared by international and
Canadian academics and practitioners, oral and written
submissions2 and a series of eight stakeholder consultations.3
The Final Report of the Task Force provides the opportunity to
reflect not only on its recommendations but also on issues that were
not addressed.4For example,while disclosure figuredprominently in
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. I wish to
thank those who have reviewed drafts of this paper or discussed the ideas raised
in it with me. I am particularly indebted to Ed Waitzer for his detailed comments.
I am also grateful to Cynthia Williams, Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Mary Condon,
Poonam Puri, Sara Seck, Sara Slinn, Marilyn Pilkington, Shin Imai, Irene
Herremans, Alan Willis, David Wiseman, Vincent-Joël Proulx and Michael
Fakhri. Finally, Faran Umar-Khitab and Marty Venalainen provided excellent
research assistance.
1. The Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, Canada Steps
Up: Final Report (October 2006), online: Task Force to Modernize Securities
Legislation in Canada5http://www.tfmsl.ca4.
2. Ibid., at p. 21; The Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada,
Canada Steps Up: Written Submissions and Presentations (October 2006), vol. 7,
online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada 5http://
www.tfmsl.ca4.
3. I participated in one of these consultations — a roundtable titled “Critical Issues
in Enforcement”, held at the University of Toronto’s Capital Markets Institute
(February 3, 2006).
4. For a discussion of the Task Force’s recommendations from the perspective of
retail investors, see Paul Halpern and Poonam Puri, “Reflections on the
Recommendations of the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in
Canada: A Retail Investor Perspective” (2008), 46 C.B.L.J. 199.
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the Task Force process, the concept of mandatory social disclosure
did not.5 The crux of this concept is that it requires publicly traded
corporations to report to investors not just the fact of revenue
generation, butalsoon themethodbywhich revenuesare generated.6
So, for example, in addition to traditional financial information, a
company would report on its patterns of legal compliance and its
policies, practices andbusiness impacts as they relate to issues suchas
the environment, labour, human rights etc.7
To date, social disclosure has garnered little attention in the
Canadian academic legal literature. The present article is one of two
that attempts to fill this void and to inform current and future policy
reform initiatives.8 In the companion piece, I address the issues at a
more conceptual level, with reference to the broader theoretical
5. Other similar terminology in the literature includes: non-financial disclosure,
extra-financial reporting, triple bottom line reporting, corporate social transpar-
ency, sustainability reporting, etc.
6. Cynthia Williams, “The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency” (1999), 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 at p. 1201. For more on the
elements of social reporting, see David Hess, “Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law
Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness” (1999), 25 J. Corp. L. 41 at p. 64
and David Hess, “Regulating Corporate Social Performance: A New Look at
Corporate Social Accounting, Auditing, and Reporting” (2001), 11 Business
Ethics Quarterly 307 at p. 318 (setting out possible items of relevance to various
stakeholder groups).
7. Although the recommendations of the final report did not make explicit mention
of social disclosure, it is both directly and indirectly referenced in some of the
underlying research studies that were commissioned. See Janis Sarra, “Moder-
nizing Disclosure in Canadian Securities Law: An Assessment of Recent
Developments in Canada and Selected Jurisdictions” (paper commissioned by
the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, May 29, 2006) at
p. 11, online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada 5http://
www.tfmsl.ca4 and Mary Condon and Poonam Puri, “The Role of Compliance
in Securities Regulatory Enforcement” (paper commissioned by the Task Force
to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, June 28, 2006) at p. 19, online:
Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada 5http://
www.tfmsl.ca4.
8. In particular: (1) in February 2008, the “Expert Panel on Securities Regulation”
was appointed by the federal finance minister to provide “advice and
recommendations to the federal Minister of Finance, and the provincial and
territorial ministers responsible for securities regulation, on the best way forward
to improve securities regulation in Canada.” See “About Us”, online: Expert
Panel on Securities Regulation 5http://www.expertpanel.ca4; and (2) under s.
143.12(1) of Ontario’s Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (OSA), the Ontario
government is required by May 31, 2007 to designate an advisory committee to
review current legislation, regulations and rules pertaining to provincial securities
law. Presumably the work of this panel will begin in due course. The last advisory
committee report was released in 2003. See FiveYearReviewCommittee,FiveYear
Review Committee Final Report — Reviewing the Securities Act (Ontario) (March
21, 2003), online: Ontario Ministry of Finance5http://www.fin.gov.on.ca4
(Five Year Review Committee, Final Report).
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frameworks of new governance and reflexive law.9 In this paper, I
turnmy attention to the underlyingmechanics. In section II, I review
the extent to which Canadian companies have been reporting social
information. In section III, I canvass the degree to which such
disclosure is actually required under securities law vis-à-vis the
continuous disclosure obligation that requires public companies to
provideperiodicandtimelydisclosure to investors. I focuson threeof
the key components of periodic disclosure — quarterly/annual
financial statements, the management discussion and analysis
(MD&A) and, most importantly, the annual information form (AIF).
Although many firms are underreporting, it is clear that a sufficient
legal basis exists to compel the disclosure of material social
information. However, various weaknesses limit the potential of
existing provisions and arguably facilitate corporate opacity. As
such, in section IVIprovidea setof recommendations that I hopewill
serve to enhance the social disclosure landscape. In section V, I offer
some concluding remarks.
II. TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE CANADIAN COMPANIES
REPORTED SOCIAL INFORMATION?
The sustainability reporting landscape in Canada has been
described as dim.10 In a 2001 report on Canada’s one hundred
largest corporations,StratosInc.noteddisappointingresults in terms
of environmental performance reporting, few expressions of “an
integrated triple bottom line vision and strategy” and under-
developed non-environmental social reporting generally.11 In a
2005 study, the Certified General Accountants Association of
Canada (CGA) sought survey data on sustainability reporting from
each corporation listed on the TSX Venture Exchange and the
Toronto Stock Exchange with head offices in Canada.12While there
9. Aaron A. Dhir, “The Politics of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Report-
ing, Shareholder Voice and Human Rights”, forthcoming in (2009), 47 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 1.
10. See Allan C. Hutchinson, The Companies We Keep: Corporate Governance for a
Democratic Society (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005), p. 301 (“In general . . . Canadian
corporations have shown only a limited appetite for such social reporting”).
11. Stratos Inc., “Stepping Forward: Corporate Sustainability Reporting in Canada”
(November 2001) at p. 16, online: Stratos Inc. 5http://www.stratos-sts.com4.
12. This survey population was chosen on the assumption that it reflected most of
Canada’s public corporations and included the prominent Canadian regions and
industrial sectors. Two hundred responses were received and the outcomes were
viewed as accurate “within +/- 5.5 percentage points, 9 times out of 10.” See
Certified General Accountants Association of Canada, “Measuring Up: A Study
on Corporate Sustainability Reporting in Canada” (2005), Part 2 at p. 34, online:
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were signs that firms are turning their attention to sustainability
issues in their reporting, the report concluded that this trend “is
relatively slow and gradual” and that “coverage of sustainability
issues continues to rank lowestof all items reportedby companies.”13
Thismirrors aConference Board ofCanada report which found that
68%of Canada’s largest corporations do not issue formal corporate
social responsibility reports and that none provides public disclosure
exceeding 60% of relevant indicators.14
Inparticular, the socialdisclosurepracticesofCanadianextractive
companies have been called into question on various occasions.15
This is of particular importance given that Canada has listed on its
stock exchangesmoremining firms than any other state.16 Globally,
theseexchanges represent“theworld’s largest sourceofequitycapital
for mining exploration and production both in Canada and
abroad.”17 In a 2001 academic study that compared the
environmental reporting of U.S. and Canadian corporations, the
authors noted “a number of resource-based companies who chose to
Certified General Accountants Association of Canada 5http://www.cga-cana-
da.org4 (CGA, “Measuring Up, Part 2”).
13. Ibid., at p. 64.
14. Conference Board of Canada, The National Corporate Social Responsibility
Report: Managing Risks, Leveraging Opportunities (June 2004) at p. 8. It should
be noted that Canadian companies have not always demonstrated a willingness to
participate in studies attempting to assess the reporting of social information. For
example, the Climate Disclosure Project seeks to advise institutional investors on
the risks associated with climate change and to advise corporate management on
related investor concerns. As part of this initiative, it invites institutional
investors to join an annual international request asking corporations for
information pertaining to greenhouse gas emissions that is relevant to share-
holder value. In the 2006 survey, participating Canadian investors represented
more than $1 trillion in total managed assets. However, less than one third of
Canadian companies approached actually responded to the request for informa-
tion — representing one of the lowest response rates in the global survey. See
Carbon Disclosure Project Report 2006 — Canada 280 at pp. vi, 2 and 6, online:
Carbon Disclosure Project 5http://www.cdproject.net/reports.asp4. The re-
sponse rate did, however, increase in 2007. See Carbon Disclosure Project Report
2007 — Canada 200 at p. i, online: Carbon Disclosure Project 5http://
www.cdproject.net4.
15. But see contra Janis Sarra and Vivian Kung, “Corporate Governance in the
Canadian Resource and Energy Sectors” (2006), 43 Alta. L. Rev. 905 at paras.
63, 64, 89-91, 93, 95-99 and 101 (QL).
16. National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility and the Canadian
Extractive Industry in Developing Countries, Advisory Group Report (March 29,
2007) at p. 3, online: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 5http://
geo.international.gc.ca4 (citation omitted).
17. Ibid. My analysis in this paper focuses on publicly traded corporations that issue
securities for public distribution/are the subject of securities regulation and are
more likely to be implicated in problematic overseas conduct that has material
relevance for investors.
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disclose absolutely nothing about their effect on the environment”
despite regulatory requirements.18 A 2006 KPMG study surveyed the
disclosureandaccountingof44 internationalmining firms, including
12 Canadian corporations. Of the jurisdictions reviewed, the
Canadian businesses placed last in terms of detailed sustainability
disclosure in annual reports.19 A 2004 study conducted by Stratos
Inc. for the National Roundtable on the Environment and the
Economy reviewed the disclosure practices of select oil and gas,
mining and financial services issuers, focusing on certain
representative social responsibility-related issues. While positive
signswere demonstrated, it was found that the disclosures of all three
sectors were lacking in very important ways.20
A 2004 study conducted for the Yale School of Forestry &
Environmental Studies inquired into the sufficiency of U.S. and
18. Nola Buhr and Martin Freedman, “Culture, Institutional Factors and Differ-
ences in Environmental Disclosure between Canada and the United States”
(2001), 12 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 293 at p. 314.
19. KPMG, “Global Mining Reporting Survey 2006” (2006) at p. 82, online: KPMG in
Canada 5http://www.kpmg.ca4. Canadian firms were in the middle of the pack
in terms of separate sustainability reports (at p. 85). See also Andy Hoffman,
“Canadian Miners Go on Buying Spree”, The Globe & Mail, December 12, 2006,
online: Globe & Mail 5www.theglobeandmail.com4 (“Canadian mining
companies are aggressively boosting their mineral reserves through acquisitions
. . . but are well behind other mining nations when it comes to disclosure on social
and environmental issues . . .”).
20. Stratos Inc., “Corporate Disclosure and Capital Markets: Demand and Supply of
Financially Relevant Corporate Responsibility Information” (December 22,
2004), online: National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy
5http://www.nrtee-trnee.ca4 (accessed August 10, 2008). Deficiencies canvas-
sed included the following: (1) oil and gas — “[o]verall, however, they present
very different strategies for addressing climate change, and provide considerably
more detail about their internal greenhouse gas . . . reduction and offsetting
activities and performance than about strategic plans to assess investments or
other actions relating to the potential long-term implications of a carbon-
constrained future” (at vi); (2) mining — “in general, however, there is only
limited disclosure of information on biodiversity risks in the public information
provided by the companies. Indeed, none of them provides a detailed description
of how the potential significance of biodiversity issues is assessed and managed”
(at pp. vi-vii); and (3) financial services — “[h]owever, the almost complete lack
of disclosure by the five reviewed banks about how they are managing social risks
in their financial services and products invites the conclusion that they are not
addressing [corporate responsibility] in a systematic manner” (at p. vii). A more
recent study by Stratos Inc. considered the sustainability reporting of seven
“recognized sustainability reporting leaders.” While this study necessarily
involved positive results, weaknesses were noted with respect to environmental
reporting and reporting “on the influence of companies on sustainability
performance in their value chain.” See Stratos Inc., “Canadian Corporate
Sustainability Reporting: Best Practices 2008” at p. 6, online: 5http://www.stra-
tos-sts.com4.
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Canadian mining firms’ environmental disclosures. The study first
accounted for the occurrence of environment-related events that had
a material financial impact on listed companies. It then reviewed
prior, current and subsequent financial disclosures andpress releases
in order to determine the precise content of the firms’ disclosures.
Materials prepared by sources external to the companies were then
reviewedwithaviewtowards establishingwhat the companyknewor
could have knownabout the event during and after its occurrence (as
well as what the company could have known about the likelihood of
the event prior to its occurrence).21 In all case studies except one, the
disclosures were found to be inadequate; in particular the disclosure
of environmental liabilities and risks thatwere known to the firmand
financially material.22
In general, the global mining industry has had difficulties with
proper risk management. In 2006, Ernst & Young surveyed the
majority of the leading 40 international mining firms, including
prominent Canadian companies. Only 39% of responding
companies were mindful of the necessity of having a
communications policy with significant equity-holders.23 Further,
55% reported that fundamental risks were not being properly
managed, including 18% who stated that environmental-related
risks were being under-managed. As stated by Ernst &Young, “[w]e
believe this is due tomining companies not yet sufficientlymanaging
or responding to emerging risks such as climate change and the
increased community pressure around the local environmental
impact.”24 Finally, turning away from group studies, while
industry giant Alcan Inc.25 has received numerous accolades for its
global sustainability practices,26 a recent analysis strongly critiqued
its 2007 sustainability report. After discussing the deficiencies, the
author concluded that “the painful realities of Alcan’s
environmentally damaging industry have been unduly minimised,
meaning the relevance of the report suffers.”27
21. The company would have had access to the materials examined (i.e. studies,
reports etc.).
22. Robert Repetto, “Silence is Golden, Leaden, and Copper: Disclosure of Material
Environmental Information in the Hard Rock Mining Industry” (July 2004), at
p. 4, online: Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 5http://
environment.yale.edu4.
23. See Ernst & Young, “Exploring the Risks: Attitudes to Risk in the Global
Mining Sector” (2006) at p. 11, online: Ernst & Young 5http://www.ey.com4.
24. Ibid., at p. 13.
25. Now Rio Tinto Alcan Inc.
26. See “Sustainability Awards and Recognition”, online: Rio Tinto Alcan
Inc.5http://www.publications.alcan.com4.
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III. TO WHAT EXTENT IS SOCIAL DISCLOSURE REQUIRED
UNDER CANADIAN SECURITIES LAW?
A key finding of the CGA study discussed above is that regulatory
requirements are the paramount determinant for corporations in
considering whether to move towards the adoption of social
reporting.28 This raises a fundamental question: to what extent is
social disclosure actually required under Canadian securities law?29
As recently noted by Professor Sarra, while social disclosure-related
provisions are “increasingly prevalent” in other jurisdictions,
“Canada’s requirements in this respect are minimal at best . . .”30
That having been said, despite the dearth of explicit terms there is—
without question — sufficient legal basis to compel the reporting of
this information if it is material. In addition to the prospectus
document that is required when a company initially goes public or
issues additional securities,31 reporting issuers are subject to a
continuous disclosure obligation which requires them to provide
periodic and timely disclosure to investors.32 The key components of
periodic disclosure are: (i) quarterly/annual financial statements, (ii)
27. See Deborah Smith, “Alcan’s 2007 Sustainability Report — A Little Too Shiny”
(February 26, 2008), online: Ethical Corporation 5http://www.ethicalcorp.-
com4.
28. CGA, “Measuring Up, Part 2”, supra, footnote 12, at p. 47.
29. It should be noted that there are reporting requirements under other regimes that
are of relevance. For example, Canadian banks with equity of one billion dollars
or higher are required to publish an annual “public accountability statement”
which is to describe “the contribution of the bank and its prescribed affiliates to
the Canadian economy and society.” See Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46, ss. 459.3.
Also, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 establishes the National
Pollutant Release Inventory, which requires firms to report on the release of
various pollutants. See Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999,
c. 33, ss. 46 and 48. Further, at the municipal level, the city of Toronto is
currently contemplating a new bylaw that would introduce an “Environmental
Reporting, Disclosure and Innovation Program” under which businesses would
be required to report annually on the use or release of 25 prescribed toxic
substances. See “Environmental Reporting, Disclosure and Innovation Pro-
gram”, online: City of Toronto 5http://www.toronto.ca4.
30. Janis Sarra, “Disclosure as a Public Policy Instrument in Global Capital
Markets” (2007), 42 Tex. Int’l L.J. 875 at p. 896. See also Benjamin J.
Richardson, “Financing Environmental Change: A New Role for Canadian
Environmental Law” (2004), 49 McGill L.J. 145 at p. 195 (“While Canadian
companies are not currently required to routinely report in their financial
statements on their environmental activities and costs, the regulatory trend in
other jurisdictions is towards mandatory corporate environmental reporting”).
31. While my discussion will focus on the continuous disclosure regime, the
disclosure of social information also has relevance in terms of prospectus
requirements.
32. Using Ontario as an example, the term “reporting issuer” has a seven-fold
definition in s. 1(1) of the OSA, supra, footnote 8. Most frequently, an issuer will
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theMD&A, (iii) theAIFand (iv) informationcirculars.For thepurposes
of social disclosure, the first three are the most germane and will be
discussed in detail; in particular in light of National Instrument 51-
102 which provides elucidation on each and serves to harmonize
continuous disclosure requirements in Canada.33
1. Financial Statements
Every Canadian reporting issuer is required to prepare and file
quarterly and annual financial statements, which include a balance
sheet, income statement, cash flow statement and statement of
retained earnings.34 The Canada Business Corporations Act (as well
as provincial corporate law statutes) requires corporate directors to
submit to shareholders the financial statements, any auditor’s report
and any other information pertaining to the corporation’s financial
position at each annual meeting.35
Financial statements are to be prepared in accordance with
“Generally Accepted Accounting Principles” (GAAP)36 which, for
Canadian issuers, means in accordance with the handbook of the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA).37 In a 2004
report, the CICAadvises that ethical, social and environmental factors
shouldbe integrated into corporate financial statements in particular
instances; for example, if the issue has led to transactions with third
be considered a reporting issuer by meeting s. 1(1)(b) (i.e. it has filed a prospectus
and been issued a receipt).
33. National Instrument 51-102, “Continuous Disclosure Obligations”, online:
Ontario Securities Commission 5www.osc.gov.on.ca4 (Unofficial Consolida-
tion, current to July 4, 2008) (NI 51-102 Consolidation). National Instruments are
developed by provincial securities administrations in collaboration and are put
forth by the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), the umbrella organization
of all provincial regulators. The fact that an instrument has been termed
“national”, as opposed to “multilateral”, reflects its adoption by the regulator of
each province. See Mark R. Gillen, Securities Regulation in Canada, 3rd ed.
(Toronto: Thomson, 2007), p. 101 and Jeffrey G. MacIntosh and Christopher C.
Nicholls, Securities Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002), pp. 83-84. NI 51-102 was
implemented in Ontario by Ontario Securities Commission Rule 51-801,
“Implementing National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations”,
online Ontario Securities Commission 5www.osc.gov.on.ca4.
34. NI 51-102 Consolidation, ibid., at pp. 14-15, ss. 4.1 and 4.3. For a detailed
explanation of each, see Christopher C. Nicholls, Corporate Finance and
Canadian Law (Scarborough: Carswell, 2000), pp. 124-33.
35. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, ss. 155(1) (CBCA).
36. National Instrument 52-107, “Acceptable Accounting Principles, Auditing
Standards and Reporting Currency”, s. 3.1(1), online: Ontario Securities
Commission 5http://www.osc.gov.on.ca4.
37. National Instrument 14-101, “Definitions”, s. 1.1(3), online: Ontario Securities
Commission 5http://www.osc.gov.on.ca4.
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partiesor results inpresent financialobligationsor futureobligations
that are known and can be estimated (e.g. costs associated with
addressing contaminated areas).38 Where financial obligations
cannot be quantified or approximated, the CICA suggests providing
disclosure via notes to the statements if omitting the information
would produce a misleading result.39 In considering the importance
of materiality,40 CICA acknowledges that these issues “may not in
themselves be material relative to the aggregate of other financial
statement line items in which they are included” and thus that they
may not “warrant separate disclosure in the body of the financial
statements.”41However, the CICA states that in situationswhere such
issues do not fit properly under GAAP, the issuer should contemplate
providing disclosure in the MD&A.42
2. The MD&A
Every Canadian reporting issuer must file an MD&A that relates to
interim and annual financial statements.43 Each year, the issuermust
send a request form to registered and beneficial holders of non-debt
instrument securities which allows them to request both the annual/
interim financial statements and the accompanyingMD&A.44 If such a
request is made, the issuer must provide a copy of the MD&A without
charge before the prescribed deadline.45 The MD&A contains both
“reflective” and “prospective” elements.46 In other words, it is a
narrative analysis on the part ofmanagement as to the corporation’s
financial performance as reflected in the financial statements and the
firm’s likely future performance.47 The MD&A plays an important
public function. It assists current and future shareholders in
evaluating underlying value and is particularly consequential for
retail investors; in particular, investorswhomay require assistance in
38. CICA, “Financial Reporting Disclosures about Social, Environmental and Ethical
(SEE) Issues” (November 2004) at pp. 11-12, online: National Round Table on the
Environment and the Economy 5http://www.nrtee-trnee.ca4 (accessed August
10, 2008) (CICA, “Financial Reporting Disclosures”).
39. Ibid., at p. 11.
40. To be discussed in more detail below.
41. See CICA, “Financial Reporting Disclosures”, supra, footnote 38, at p. 12.
42. Ibid.
43. NI 51-102 Consolidation, supra, footnote 33, at p. 34, ss. 5.1(1).
44. Ibid., at 17-18, s. 4.6(1).
45. Ibid., at p. 37, s. 5.6(1).
46. Mary G. Condon, Anita I. Anand and Janis P. Sarra, Securities Law in Canada:
Cases and Commentary (Toronto, Emond Montgomery, 2005), p. 362.
47. Form 51-102F1, “Management’s Discussion & Analysis”, NI 51-102 Consolida-
tion, supra, footnote 33, at p. 77, part 1(a) (51-102F1).
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interpreting the information contained in the financial statements.48
Form 51-102F1 provides guidance on the specifics to be included
in the MD&A. Part 2, s. 1(4)(d) provides as follows:
[F]or issuers that have significant projects that have not yet generated
operating revenue, describe each project, including your company’s plan for
the project and the status of the project relative to that plan, and expenditures
made and how these relate to anticipated timing and costs to take the project
to the next stage of the project plan . . .49
Instruction (ii) then gives the following clarification: “[y]our
discussion under paragraph 1.4(d) should include . . . any factors
that have affected the value of the project(s) such as change in
commodity prices, land use or political or environmental issues.”50
While this is the only MD&A-related provision that explicitly
references the reporting of social issues, these issues could easily fall
within the more general provisions. Namely, issuers must also
provide information on the following:
. “known trends, demands, commitments, events or uncertain-
ties that are reasonably likely to have an effect on your
company’s business;”51
. “any . . . significant factors that caused changes in net sales or
total revenues;”52
. “commitments, events, risks or uncertainties that you reason-
ably believe will materially affect your company’s future
performance including net sales, total revenue and income or
loss before discontinued operations and extraordinary
items;”53 and
. “unusual or infrequent events or transactions.”54
The CICAhas provided a guidance document on the preparation of
effectiveMD&Adisclosures in the formof sixorganizingprinciplesand
an accompanying disclosure structure. While it is not binding on
Canadian companies, the four primary regulators have urged
reporting issuers to employ it as a disclosure framework.55 The
guidance document recommends that the MD&A should set out
48. Condon, Anand and Sarra, Securities Law in Canada, supra, footnote 46, at pp.
362-63.
49. 51-102F1, supra, footnote 47, at p. 82, part 2, ss. 1(4)(d).
50. Ibid., part 2, s. 1(4), instruction (ii) (emphasis added).
51. Ibid., at p. 80, part 2, s. 1(2).
52. Ibid., at p. 82, part 2, s. 1(4)(b).
53. Ibid., part 2, s. 1(4)(g).
54. Ibid., part 2, s. 1(4)(j).
55. CICA, “Management’s Discussion and Analysis: Guidance on Preparation and
Disclosure” as cited in CICA, “Financial Reporting Disclosures”, supra, footnote
38, at p. 15.
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pivotal performance drivers and related performance measures/
indicators.56 The former are defined as “those activities,
competencies and qualities in which superior performance and
favourable results are essential for the company, core business or
segment toachieve itsvisionandstrategicgoals.”57Most importantly
for the present discussion, the guidance document sets out specific
examples of critical performance drivers for which performancemay
be gauged and reported on. Such drivers expressly include social and
environmental responsibility, leadership and governance and
reputation.58 Moreover, while not specifically mentioned under the
guidance document’s sectionon risk-relateddisclosures, social issues
could very well fall within the following recommended practice:
A company should disclose its principal risks and describe related risk
management systems to enable MD&A report readers to understand and
evaluate the company’s risks and its decisions regarding the management of
such risks. Such disclosure should include:
. the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company and its core
businesses and segments, as appropriate;
. the strategies and processes employed for managing these risks; and
. the potential specific impact of these risks on results and capabilities,
including capital resources and liquidity.59
3. The AIF
With the exception of venture issuers, Canadian public companies
must file an AIF.60 Similar to the prospectus, the AIF is a detailed
disclosure document that is intended to set out material information
about the issuer, its businessoperationsand futureprospects.TheAIF
also describes risks the issuer is facing and other outside factors that
affect the firm.61 Form 51-102F2 provides guidance on the
particulars to be included in the AIF. Of the key components of
periodic disclosure, this document sets out the most explicit
requirements of reporting social information. As such, it is of
assistance to quote the relevant provisions here; specially, ss.
5.1(1)(k), 5.1(4) and 5.2 mandate the following disclosure:
56. Ibid., at p. 16.
57. Ibid., at p. 17.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., at pp. 17-18. In this regard, the guidance document “emphasizes and
expands upon risk disclosure requirements in the MD&A and in the AIF” (at p. 18).
60. NI 51-102 Consolidation, supra, footnote 33, at p. 40, s. 6.1.
61. Form 51-102F2, “Annual Information Form”, NI 51-102 Consolidation, supra,
footnote 33, at p. 98 part 1(a).
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Environmental Protection — The financial and operational effects of
environmental protection requirements on the capital expenditures, earnings
and competitive position of your company in the current financial year and
the expected effect in future years.62
. . . . .
Social or Environmental Policies — If your company has implemented
social or environmental policies that are fundamental to your operations,
such as policies regarding your company’s relationship with the environ-
ment or with the communities in which it does business, or human rights
policies, describe them and the steps your company has taken to implement
them.63
. . . . .
Disclose risk factors relating to your company and its business, such as cash
flow and liquidity problems, if any, experience of management, the general
risks inherent in the business carried on by your company, environmental
and health risks, reliance on key personnel, regulatory constraints, economic
or political conditions and financial history and any other matter that
would be most likely to influence an investor’s decision to purchase
securities of your company. If there is a risk that securityholders of your
company may become liable to make an additional contribution beyond the
price of the security, disclose that risk.
Instructions
(i) Disclose the risks in order of seriousness from the most serious to the least
serious.
(ii) A risk factor must not be de-emphasized by including excessive caveats
or conditions.64
Further, under s. 5(1)(d), (e) and (f) reporting issuers withmineral
projects must report the following information:
All environmental liabilities to which the project is subject.65
The location of all known . . . existing tailing ponds, waste deposits and
important natural features and improvements.66
To the extent known, the permits that must be acquired to conduct the work
proposed for the project and if the permits have been obtained.67
Thisprovision shouldbe read in concertwithNational Instrument
43-101, which sets out disclosure standards that are specific to
mineral projects. Of particular note, under this instrument a
reporting issuer is required to file a technical report for mineral
projects on propertiesmaterial to the issuer.68A report that discloses
mineral reserves or resources must include, inter alia, “a general
62. Ibid., at p. 103.
63. Ibid., at p. 104 (emphasis added).
64. Ibid. (emphasis added).
65. Ibid., at p. 106.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. National Instrument 43-101, “Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects”, ss.
4.1(1), online: Ontario Securities Commission5www.osc.gov.on.ca4 (NI 43-101).
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discussion on the extent to which the estimate of mineral resources
and mineral reserves may be materially affected by any known
environmental . . . legal . . . socio-economic . . . political or other
relevant issues . . .”69
Finally, while not expressly referencing social disclosure, ss.
12.1(1) to (3) and 12.2(b) of the AIF could also be of relevance; for
example, with respect to human rights-related litigation or
environmental/labour regulatory infractions. These provisions
provide as follows:
(1) Describe any legal proceedings your company is or was a party to, or that any
of its property is or was the subject of, during your company’s financial year.
(2) Describe any such legal proceedings your company knows to be
contemplated.
(3) For each proceeding described in subsections (1) and (2), include the
name of the court or agency, the date instituted, the principal parties to the
proceeding, the nature of the claim, the amount claimed, if any, whether the
proceeding is being contested, and the present status of the proceeding.
INSTRUCTION
You do not need to give information with respect to any proceeding that
involves a claim for damages if the amount involved, exclusive of interest
and costs, does not exceed ten per cent of the current assets of your company.
However, if any proceeding presents in large degree the same legal and
factual issues as other proceedings pending or known to be contemplated,
you must include the amount involved in the other proceedings in computing
the percentage.70
. . . . .
Describe
(b) any other penalties or sanctions imposed by a court or regulatory body
against your company that would likely be considered important to a
reasonable investor in making an investment decision71
4. OSC Staff Notice 51-716
In February 2008, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC)
released Staff Notice 51-716.72 SN 51-716 expressly notes that NI 51-
102 necessitates the disclosure of environmental-related information
in a reporting issuer’s continuous disclosure documents. In order to
assess compliance, the OSC reviewed the financial statements, MD&As
and AIFs of 35 reporting issuers from seven industries, as well as
information contained on each firm’s website.73
69. Form 43-101F1, “Technical Report”, in NI 43-101, ibid., s. 19(g).
70. Form 51-102F2, supra, footnote 61, at p. 117.
71. Ibid.
72. OSC Staff Notice 51-716, “Environmental Reporting” (2008), 31 OSCB 2220,
online: Ontario Securities Commission 5www.osc.gov.on.ca4 (SN 51-716).
73. Ibid., at p. 2220.
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The results of the study were less than encouraging. For instance,
the OSC found that many reporting issuers simply provided a
boilerplate articulation of environment liabilities in their MD&A,
with little to no analysis. Others did not review environmental
estimates at all.74 Themajority of reporting issuers that incorporated
disclosure on environmental protection requirements in their AIF
neglected toquantify the relevant costs or the effect/possible effecton
operational and financial results.75Anumberof reporting issuers did
not include any significant description of environmental policies
fundamental to theirbusinessoperationsor the steps taken toexecute
any such policies; other issuers simply gave generic information.76 In
terms of environmental risks, some issuers used standard-form
language and did not quantify the associated costs. For example,
rather than enumerating and discussing applicable legal provisions
andmeasuring current and future costs of compliance, one company
merely acknowledged that it would sustain penalties if it breached
relevant environmental laws and stated that “there was no assurance
that it could comply with these laws.”77
In each of the situations described above, the OSC described the
boilerplate disclosure received as “insufficient.”78 This echoes the
findings of a recent study conducted by the Alberta Securities
Commission (ASC), which reviewed the 2007 continuous disclosure
filings of reporting issuers in that province. The ASC found various
74. Ibid., at p. 2221.
75. Ibid., at p. 2223. Professor Richardson has found that the requirement to disclose
the material results of environmental protection requirements in the AIF has been
“easily discharged with a few perfunctory words.” See Richardson, “Financing
Environmental Change”, supra, footnote 30, at p. 196 (using Shell Canada as an
example).
76. SN 51-716, ibid., at p. 2224.
77. Ibid.
78. For commentary and a sample of the reaction to SN 51-716, see Sandra Rubin,
“When OSC Goes Green, Lawyers See Red”, Globe and Mail, March 19, 2008,
online: Globe and Mail 5https://secure.globeadvisor.com4 (“How are we going
to put metrics on that? Has the OSC even thought of that? This is accountants at
the OSC running amok”); Terence Corcoran, “Green Boilerplate from the OSC:
Corcoran”, Financial Post, February 28, 2008, online: Financial Post Comment
5http://network.nationalpost.com4 (“That there might be significant costs
associated with sending a new batch of environmental lawyers, accountants and
consultants to dig into all kinds of potentials risks — real, hypothetical or
imagined by green activists — doesn’t appear in the report”); Janet McFarland,
“Clean up Environmental Disclosure: OSC”, Globe and Mail , February 28, 2008,
online: Globe and Mail5http://www.theglobeandmail.com4; Peter Brieger,
“Companies Not Disclosing Enough about Environmental Risks: OSC”, Financial
Post, February 27, 2008, online: Financial Post 5http://www.financialpost.-
com4 (accessed August 5, 2008) and Gloria Gonzalez, “Disclosing Environ-
mental Risks a Growing Concern in Canada” (2008), 42 Business Insurance 17.
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disclosure deficiencies, including inadequate risk language in the
MD&AandAIF. It cited thedescriptionofenvironmental riskexposure,
environmental protection requirements, environmental policies and
the accounting of environmental liabilities as “common
deficiencies.”79
IV. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING REQUIREMENTS/
RECOMMENDATIONS
As mentioned above, despite the paucity of provisions that
expressly reference the reporting of sustainability-related disclosure,
it is clear that this information must be reported if it is material.80
However, various weaknesses exist and I will now offer a set of
recommendations that I hope will serve to enhance the social
disclosure landscape in Canada.81
1. Enhancing the AIF’s Potential
First, as noted above, the AIF is of particular importance as it
articulates themost explicit social reporting requirements.However,
aclose readingsuggests thateventheseprovisionscan(andshould)be
strengthened. Form 51-102F2 only requires reporting on policies
fundamental tooperations relating tohumanrights, the environment
or relevant communities if they have been implemented by the
issuer.82 If no such policies exist, the issuer is not obliged to disclose
that fact or to explain the reasons for these omissions.83 This is not in
linewith emerging best practices in other comparable jurisdictions.84
79. Alberta Securities Commission, “Continuous Disclosure Review Program 2007
Report” (February 2008) at p. 20, online: Alberta Securities Commission
5www.albertasecurities.com4.
80. See also Shawn H.T. Denstedt and Scott R. Miller, “Due Diligence in Disclosing
Environmental Information for Securities Transactions” (1995), 33 Alta. L. Rev.
231 at p. 9 of the QL version (“Notwithstanding the lack of specificity in Canada,
it is clear, in the authors’ view, that environmental issues fall under those items
often referred to in securities legislation as ‘Other Material Facts’ ’’). As noted
previously, the concept of materiality will be discussed in more detail below.
81. The inadequate disclosure of social information described above is symptomatic
of continuous disclosure deficiencies in general. See Condon, Anand and Sarra,
Securities Law in Canada, supra, footnote 46, at pp. 364 and 366 (discussing
studies conducted by regulators in Alberta and Quebec).
82. 51-102F2, supra, footnote 61, s. 5.1(4).
83. Gil Yaron, Memorandum to OSC Continuous Disclosure Advisory Committee
titled “Corporate Disclosure of Material Social and Environmental Information”
(June 28, 2005), at p. 6, online: SHARE 5http://www.share.ca4.
84. Professor Williams has identified the social disclosure elements of U.K./E.U.
reporting regimes as reflecting emerging best practices. See Cynthia A.
Williams, Memorandum to the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation in
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For example, the U.K. Companies Act 2006 received Royal Assent
on November 8, 2006.85 Section 417, which came into force on
October 1, 2007,86 explicitly requires social reporting as part of the
“business review” that must form part of the director’s report.87
Under it, if the prescribed information is not revealed (including
policies relating to environmental, labour and social/community
issues), there must be an explicit statement of what has been
omitted.88 Further, while Form 51-102F2 asks the issuer to describe
steps taken to implement any relevant social policies, it is lacking
insofar as it doesnot require anevaluationof their success.Again, the
Canadian instrument is out of step with the U.K. equivalent, which
requires consideration of the policies’ effectiveness.89 In that regard,
the form should be revised so that reporting issuers are asked to
provide disclosure even if they have not adopted such policies and to
discuss the efficacy of policies that have been implemented.90
Canada (July 15, 2008), online: Expert Panel on Securities Regulation 5http://
www.expertpanel.ca4 (“Emerging best practice in both the European Union
and the United Kingdom recognizes that future risks and opportunities include
significant social and environmental risks and opportunities . . . For Canada to
require similar information would bring its disclosure requirements in line with
emerging best practice in the developed capital markets and in line with the
expectations of global institutional investors”).
85. “Explanatory Notes to Companies Act 2006”, online: Office of Public Sector
Information 5http://www.opsi.gov.uk4.
86. “The Companies Act 2006 (Commencement No. 3, Consequential Amendments,
Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2007”, ss. 2(1)(g), online: Office of
Public Sector Information 5http://www.opsi.gov.uk4.
87. Companies Act 2006 (U.K.), 2006, c. 46, s. 417 (Companies Act 2006). The
“business review” replaces the former requirement that listed corporations
prepare an annual Operating and Financial Review and Directors Report (OFR).
For an analysis of the social reporting elements of the OFR, and the process that
led to its implementation, see Charlotte Villiers, Corporate Reporting and
Company Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 205-27;
Cynthia A. Williams and John M. Conley, “An Emerging Third Way? The
Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct” (2005), 38 Cornell
Int’l L.J. 493 and Cynthia A. Williams and John M. Conley, “Triumph or
Tragedy? The Curious Path of Corporate Disclosure Reform in the U.K.” (2007),
31 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 317. In the latter piece, the authors opine
that the Companies Act 2006 “may accomplish the same substantive ends as the
OFR requirements in a more effective way” (at p. 321).
88. Companies Act 2006, ibid., s. 417(5)(c).
89. Ibid., s. 417(5)(b).
90. Yaron recommends the following revised wording: “Describe the extent (if it all)
to which your company has implemented social or environmental policies that
are fundamental to your operations, such as policies regarding your company’s
relationship with the environment or with the communities in which it does
business, or human rights polices, and the steps your company has taken to
implement them.” Yaron, supra, footnote 83, at p. 19. While this is a step in the
right direction, it does not address the “efficacy” issue. I would suggest wording
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Second, the reporting issuer is under no legal obligation to directly
distribute the AIF to its shareholders.91 Even though the information
it contains is sometimes included in corporate annual reports, firms
are under no obligation to prepare such reports.92 While many, of
course, do in any event (both as a way of attracting new equity
investment andas awayof reporting to existing shareholders), it is by
no means guaranteed that AIF-necessary information will be
included.93
Third, inaddition topointingout faultydisclosure, theOSC’s SN51-
716 also serves as a reminder that certifying officers and audit
committees have respective roles to play in ensuring that the
information contained in continuous disclosure documents is a fair
representation of a firm’s financial health.94 Along these lines, the
annual financial statements must be audited and approved by the
board of directors.95 The MD&A must also receive approval from the
boardofdirectorsor, in thecaseofan interimMD&A, theboard’saudit
committee.96 However, there is no requirement that the board
that is in harmony with ss. 417(5) of the Companies Act 2006, which provides as
follows:
(5) In the case of a quoted company the business review must, to the extent
necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position
of the company’s business, include . . .
(b) information about—
(i) environmental matters (including the impact of the company’s
business on the environment),
(ii) the company’s employees, and
(iii) social and community issues,
including information about any policies of the company in relation to those
matters and the effectiveness of those policies; and
. . . .
If the review does not contain information of each kind mentioned in
paragraphs (b)(i), (ii) and (iii) . . . it must state which of those kinds of
information it does not contain.
91. Condon, Anand and Sarra, Securities Law in Canada, supra, footnote 46, at p.
364 (“There is no requirement to send an AIF directly to security holders . . .”).
92. National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, “Capital Markets
and Sustainability: Investing in a Sustainable Future” (February 2007) at p. 15,
online: National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy 5http://
www.nrtee-trnee.com4.
93. Indeed, “the AIF is not generally distributed to shareholders, is not always
presented together with the financial statements and MD&A and is not required for
venture issuers.” See CICA, “Financial Reporting Disclosures”, supra, footnote 38,
at p. 21. Of course, for those investors who are already anticipating this
information, it is publicly available online via SEDAR (System for Electronic
Document Analysis and Retrieval). See Condon, Anand and Sarra, Securities
Law in Canada, supra, footnote 46, at p. 364.
94. SN 51-716, supra, footnote 72, at p. 2225.
95. NI 51-102 Consolidation, supra, footnote 33, at p. 15, s. 4.1(2) and p. 17, s. 4.5(1).
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approve the AIF or that the audit committee review it.97 Therefore, of
the primary documents employed to meet a reporting issuer’s
continuous disclosure requirements, the one most central to social
disclosure is subject to the least rigorous review.98
This is potentially problematic at three levels: (a) it implicitly
establishes a hierarchyof informationwhere social factors are valued
less. This serves to perpetuate the misconception that such
information is not material to a reporting issuer’s business
operations (or, at least, not as material); (b) given that both the
MD&Aand theAIF requiredisclosureofmaterial risks, the corporation
may be more inclined to report on this information as it relates to
social disclosure in the AIF;99 and (c) the requirement of board
approval is useful not only in terms of ensuring the adequacy of the
disclosure. For issues that may not have traditionally occupied a
prominent role in internal corporate discourse (human rights, the
environment etc.), it is also likely that this prescription will cause
directors to consider these issues more thoroughly and to make
inquiries where there are ambiguities100— thus serving to eventually
normalize these topics in the overall corporate culture.
In light of points (b) and (c) above, consideration should be given
to obligating the disclosure of the AIF to shareholders directly and to
necessitating board or audit committee approval. In the alternative,
regulators should revisit the question of what is the optimal location
for sustainability disclosure in securities filings. What location will
bestallowshareholders to see the“biggerpicture”as itpertains to this
disclosure in terms of contextualizing the information within the
backdrop of the business’ overall financial position and future
direction? Given the discussion above, it may be the case that the
express sustainability disclosure provisions should be transferred
from the AIF to the MD&A. Or it may be the case that the best way
forward is to establish a mandatory, dedicated social disclosure
instrument.101
96. Ibid., at p. 36, s. 5.5(1) and p. 37, s. 5.5(3).
97. As with the financial statements and the MD&A, certifying officers must attest to
the adequacy of the AIF. See Multilateral Instrument 52-109, “Certification of
Disclosure in Issuers’ Annual and Interim Filings”, online: Ontario Securities
Commission 5http://www.osc.gov.on.ca4.
98. CICA, “Financial Reporting Disclosures”, supra, footnote 38, at p. 23 (“Informa-
tion provided in an MD&A, therefore, is subjected to a more rigorous review
process than information provided in the AIF or the information circular, neither
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2. Interpretative Guidance
Fourth, regulators must stay apprised of social-disclosure related
developments inother jurisdictions (suchas therelevantprovisionsof
the U.K. Companies Act 2006 discussed above) and continuously
evaluate how/if these developments can be effectively incorporated
into the Canadian framework.102 They must also continue/increase
efforts to provide reporting issuers with interpretive guidance on
social disclosure.
With SN 51-716, the OSC has taken a step in the right direction; in
particular insofar as it presents illustrations of successful disclosures.
For example, with respect to the disclosure of environment liabilities
in the MD&A, the notice gives an example of a reporting issuer that
took great pains to discuss the issue of reclamation costs (i.e., the
expenses associated with returning a site to its prior condition if
mineralizedmaterial is not located). The issuer began by referencing
the applicable laws in various jurisdictions where its mines were
located. It then discussed the difficulties of approximating
reclamation costs, but proceeded to deliver an itemization of
estimated costs for both closed and open mines. The issuer also set
out the basis for these estimated figures and themethodology used in
reaching themandendedbyamortizinganyshifts in itsapproximated
expenses over the duration of the open mines’ operations. The
dissemination of examples such as this can be of great assistance to
other issuers in compiling their disclosures. It also serves to actively
validate the disclosure of the issuer that is cited.103 SN 51-716 is also
key for its reminder of the importance of international business
activity.104 This is of particular salience with respect to Canadian
multinational enterprises that conduct business abroad via a
101. Ibid., at p. 31.
102. For a review of sustainability reporting in other European jurisdictions (in
particular, France) see Williams and Conley, “An Emerging Third Way”, supra,
footnote 8, at pp. 504-505 (“[i]t is France . . . that has been the leader in the field
of required social and environmental disclosure”). See also Lucien J. Dhooge,
“Beyond Voluntarism: Social Disclosure and France’s Nouvelles Regulations
Economiques” (2004), 21 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law
441. For a discussion and critique of Australian requirements, see Juliette
Overland, “Corporate Social Responsibility in Context: The Case for Compul-
sory Sustainability Disclosure for Listed Public Companies in Australia?”
(September 2007), online: SSRN 5http://papers.ssrn.com4. See also Yaron,
supra, footnote 83, at p. 11.
103. SN 51-716, supra, footnote 72, at p. 2221.
104. Ibid., at p. 2224 (“We are of the view that if any risks relating to environmental
laws are material to an issuer’s operations, whether national or international, the
issuer should include a detailed discussion of these laws”) (emphasis added).
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subsidiary created in the host state. In these situations, it is important
that the subsidiary’s conduct be accounted for. Guidance should be
taken fromU.S. cases such as In theMatter of Caterpillar Inc., where
theSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC) foundthatCaterpillar
Inc. had failed to provide sufficient MD&A disclosure ,when it
neglected to discuss material aspects of a Brazilian subsidiary’s
operations.105
That being said, there is also room for improvement going
forward. To date, Canadian regulators have provided little specific
guidance on climate change disclosure, which has assumed a
heightened importance. For example, in September 2007 a broad
coalition of U.S. investors (representing 1.5 trillion USD in assets)
submitted a petition to the SEC asking it to provide clarification to the
effect that “material climate-related informationmust be included in
corporate disclosures under existing law.”106 This request for
clarification was reiterated in June 2008. In a supplemental letter to
the SEC, the coalition highlighted an increasing body of domestic and
transnational law designed to curb greenhouse gas emissions and
repeated its call for interpretative guidance.107
In that regard, the CICA has produced a discussion paper108 that is
currently under revision and could serve as the basis for a future staff
notice that would be dedicated to providing firms with detailed
guidance on their climate change-related disclosures under securities
law.109 The content of such disclosure might include, for example:
“[p]hysical risks associated with climate change that are material to
the company’s operationsor financial condition; [fi]nancial risks and
economic opportunities associated with present or probable
105. In the Matter of Caterpillar Inc., 1992 WL 71907 (March 31, 1992) at p. 8
(“[Caterpillar] should have discussed the impact of [the subsidiary] on Cater-
pillar’s overall results of operations [and] should have discussed the future
uncertainties regarding [the subsidiary’s] operations, the possible risk of
Caterpillar having materially lower earnings as a result of that risk and, to the
extent reasonably practicable, quantified the impact of such risk”).
106. See “Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure” (September
18, 2007) at p. 9, online: SEC 5http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-
547.pdf4.
107. See coalition letter to the SEC (June 12, 2008), online: Investor Network on
Climate Risk 5www.ceres.org4. For a discussion of U.S. securities law
obligations as they relate to climate change-related disclosure see Perry E.
Wallace, “Climate Change, Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate Disclosure: Are
Things Heating up in the Boardroom?” (2008), 26 Va. Envtl. L.J. 293.
108. Canadian Performance Reporting Board, “MD&A Disclosure about the Financial
Impact of Climate Change and other Environmental Issues” (October 2005),
online: Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 5http://www.cica.ca4.
109. Letter of the Social Investment Organization to the Ontario Securities Commis-
sion (April 21, 2008), online: SIO 5http://www.socialinvestment.ca4.
454 CanadianBusiness LawJournal [Vol. 47
greenhouse gas regulation; [and] [l]egal proceedings relating to
climate change.”110 Indesigning suchanotice, regulators shouldalso
draw from the work of the Global Framework for Climate Risk
Disclosure. Established by a group of leading institutional investors,
the frameworkhas produced a guide that provides corporationswith
particulars on how to best report on certain elements of climate
change.111 Regard should also be had for the Greenhouse Gas
Protocol’s “CorporateAccounting andReporting Standard” (which
sets out advice and standards for businesses on accounting for and
reporting on the six greenhouse gases addressed under the Kyoto
Protocol)112 and the International Organizat ion for
Standardization’s recently published standards for greenhouse gas
accounting and verification (which extend guidance on the
quantification and reporting of emissions and emission reductions
at the project and organizational levels, as well as the validation/
verification of assertions).113
Similarly, Canadian regulators have also provided little assistance
on the disclosure of material risks associated with human rights and
economic/political conditions. This deficiency must be remedied
given the linkages increasingly made between Canadian corporate
operations overseas and human rights deprivations.114 As a starting
point, while I have argued that human rights-related risks
undoubtedly fall under the existing social disclosure provisions, for
the purposes of clarity I recommend that ss. 5.2 of Form51-102F2be
amended to specifically include them(i.e., in addition to the currently
enumerated “environmental and health risks,” “economic or
political conditions” etc.).115
3. Regular Reviews of Continuous Disclosure Filings
Further (and hand in handwith the recommendation of providing
more fulsome interpretative guidance), as was done by the OSC in SN
110. See “Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure”, supra,
footnote 106, at p. 9.
111. “Using the Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure: Guide to Disclosing
Climate Risk to Investors” (October 2006), online: CalPERS Shareowner Forum
5http://www.calpers-governance.org4.
112. Greenhouse Gas Protocol, “A Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard”
(revised edition, March 2004), online: Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative
5http://www.ghgprotocol.org4.
113. “New ISO 14064 Standards Provide Tools for Assessing and Supporting
Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Emissions Trading” (March 3, 2006), online:
International Organization for Standardization 5http://www.iso.org4.
114. SeeDhir, “The Politics ofKnowledgeDissemination”, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 6-8.
115. Form 51-102F2, supra, footnote 61, at p. 104.
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51-716 with respect to environmental disclosures, regulators should
conduct regular reviews of continuous disclosure filings that
specifically focus on human rights-related risks.116 For this
recommendation, I offer two comments.
To begin, regulators typically conduct periodic reviews, which
were harmonized by the CSA in 2004.117 After a problem with a
reporting issuer’s continuous disclosure is identified, it is brought to
the issuer’s attentionviaa comment letter thatasks the issuer either to
address theerroror tosubmita replyexplainingwhycorrectiveaction
is not necessary. If a resolution cannot be reached, enforcement
action will be considered.118 In 2004, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office recommended that all SEC comment letters,
and the responses of issuers, should be made fully available to the
public in the form of a searchable electronic database.119 The SEC
subsequently adopted this recommendation.120 However, using the
OSC’swebsiteasacase study,onlyasummaryof thedeficiency ismade
available, as well as the issuer’s post-correction press release.121
Posting the OSC’s actual comment letter, and any response received,
would help to ensure that investors/the public and other issuers fully
understand the substance and conclusions of regulatory continuous
disclosure reviews and would assist civil society and academia in
116. Other issued-oriented reviews have been conducted in the past pertaining to
executive compensation disclosure and income trusts. See CSA Staff Notice 51-304,
“Report on Staff’s Review of Executive Compensation Disclosure” (November
2002), online: Ontario Securities Commission 5http://www.osc.gov.on.ca4 and
CSA Multilateral Staff Notice 51-310, “Report on Staff’s Continuous Disclosure
Review of Income Trust Issuers” (February 13, 2004), online: Ontario Securities
Commission 5http://www.osc.gov.on.ca4. Given that organisations such as the
ones cited above (the CICA, the CGA, the Conference Board etc.) already have
experience and established methodologies for conducting similar sorts of reviews,
it may be most efficient for regulators to work in partnership with them. Further,
it may be of assistance to establish linkages with, and to enlist support of,
securities experts in academia.
117. CSA Staff Notice 51-312, “Harmonized Continuous Disclosure Review Program”
(July 16, 2004), online: Ontario Securities Commission 5www.osc.gov.on.ca4.
118. Ibid., at p. 6477.
119. United States Government Accountability Office, “Environmental Disclosure:
SEC Should Explore Ways to Improve Tracking and Transparency of Informa-
tion” (July 2004) at pp. 36-37, online: United States Government Accountability
Office 5http://www.gao.gov4 (GAO, “Environmental Disclosure”).
120. See “SEC Staff to Begin Publicly Releasing Comment Letters and Responses”
(May 9, 2005), online: SEC 5http://www.sec.gov4.
121. “Reporting Issuers Refilings and Errors List”, online: Ontario Securities
Commission5http://www.osc.gov.on.ca4; telephone conversation with OSC
Inquiries Officer Scott Murray (July 31, 2008) (confirming that comment letters
and responses are not made publicly available on the OSC’s website).
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conducting more meaningful reviews and evaluations of corporate
disclosure.122
In addition,with respect tomaterial human rights reporting, it can
no longer be credibly argued that appropriate benchmarks do not
exist. The Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) “G3 Guidelines”
contain a set of human rights-specific performance indicators that
facilitatedisclosure relating to the effects of a firm’soperationson the
rights of its stakeholders. Based on theUnitedNations international
human rights framework, the indicators cover investment processes,
discrimination, collective bargaining/freedom of association, forced
labour, child labour, security processes and the rights of indigenous
peoples.123 Taking investment as an example, among other things,
the reporter is asked to disclose the number of significant/material
investment agreements entered into and how those agreements
incorporateprovisions relating tohumanrights orwhether theyhave
been through a process of human rights-related screening.124
Theneedforregulatory intervention isunderscoredbythe fact that
the CGA study discussed above found that slightly less than one-
quarter of participating firms were even cognizant of the GRI and its
work.125 As noted by the CGA, “[t]his outcome demonstrates that the
GRI is still relatively unknown amongst amajority of publicly-traded
companies inCanada.”126Andyetapprovalof theGRI is considerable
amongst numerous other actors. Support for the reporting
framework has been expressed by the CGA,127 the CICA,128 Stratos
122. GAO, “Environmental Disclosure”, supra, footnote 119, at p. 36.
123. Global Reporting Initiative, “Human Rights Performance Indicators” (2006) at
pp. 1-2, online: GRI 5http://www.globalreporting.org4.
124. Ibid., at p. 3. A recent study conducted by the GRI and the Roberts Environmental
Center surveyed the human rights-related reporting of 100 global corporations.
Of the nine performance indicators set out in the G3 Guidelines, four were
omitted completely by approximately 50% of the respondents. Further, when
“strict compliance with quantitative G3 Human Rights Performance Indicators
was examined, fully conforming reporting was found in only 7% of possible cases
for companies who declared use of G3 Guidelines and 2% for other companies.”
See Global Reporting Initiative, “Reporting on Human Rights” (2008), online:
GRI 5http://www.globalreporting.org4.
125. See CGA, “Measuring Up, Part 2”, supra, footnote 12, at p. 54.
126. Ibid. More recently, there are signs that a growing number of Canadian reporting
issuers are using the GRI reporting framework. However, this is still limited to less
than one half of issuers that actually engage in sustainability reporting. And even
of these issuers, the most recent studies indicate that over 85% are not using the
most recent version of the framework. See Stratos, “Canadian Corporate
Sustainability Reporting”, supra, footnote 20, at p. 4.
127. Certified General Accountants Association of Canada, “Measuring Up: A Study
on Corporate Sustainability Reporting in Canada” (2005), Part 4, at p. 81,
online: Certified General Accountants Association of Canada 5www.cga-
canada.org4 (“the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines . . . provided by the
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Inc.,129 the National Round Table on the Environment and the
Economy,130 the Canadian social investment community131 and
Canadian academics.132 Internationally, in 2007 Sweden became the
first government to require state-owned firms to report annually on
sustainability issues using the GRI framework.133 Beginning in 2003,
South Africa’s Johannesburg Securities Exchange began requiring
listedcorporations to reportonenvironmentalandsocial issuesusing
the GRI structure as a reference tool.134
4. A Comment on Enforcement
Beforeproceeding to the fifth recommendation, I should comment
briefly on the issue of enforcement. One possible strategy for
Global Reporting Initiative . . . represent the best framework for achieving
necessary standardization”).
128. The CICA was a GRI founding member. See “Canada’s CAs Support Integrating
Environment and Social Issues into Corporate Reporting” (February 12, 2007),
online: Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 5http://www.cica.ca4.
129. Stratos, “Corporate Disclosure and Capital Markets”, supra, footnote 20, at p. 39
(“In their sustainability reports or integrated reports, companies should consider
following the international guidelines being developed by the Global Reporting
Initiative . . . In a very pronounced trend, the best sustainability reporters
internationally are increasingly modeling their reports on the GRI”).
130. National Round Table, “Capital Markets and Sustainability”, supra, footnote 92,
at p. 32 (“Recommendation 5.3[:] That the Canadian Securities Administrators
encourage the disclosure of financially material ESG issues through publication of
a guidance or interpretation statement and encourage Canadian firms to be
guided by established reporting frameworks such as the Global Reporting
Initiative”).
131. Social Investment Organization, “Written Submission to the National Round-
tables on Corporate Social Responsibility and the Canadian Extractive Sector in
Developing Countries” (September 13, 2006) at p. 5, online: 5http://geo.inter-
national.gc.ca4 (“Provincial securities acts could be amended to require publicly
listed companies to report to the GRI framework. The Canadian Securities
Administrators could approve similar regulations. However, the federal govern-
ment also could have a potential role to play in this by requiring . . . that all
publicly listed companies chartered under the Canada Business Corporations Act
. . . be required to issue annual GRI reports”).
132. In focusing on the Canadian upstream petroleum industry, a recent study
concluded that of the existing sustainability reporting frameworks the “GRI
Guidelines provide the best umbrella framework and the most credible general
system for reporting.” See Irene Herremans et al., “Sustainability Reporting in
the Upstream Petroleum Industry in Canada” (January 15, 2007) at p. 4, online:
Institute for Sustainable Energy, Environment and Economy 5http://www.i-
seee.ca4 (stating, as well, the need for a sector supplement on the petroleum
industry).
133. “Sweden Pioneers a Global First in Sustainability Reporting” (2007), online:
Global Reporting Initiative 5http://www.globalreporting.org4.
134. Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 110.
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achieving enhanced social disclosure is to insist that regulators take
steps towards more robust forms of enforcement, including
“initiating a high-profile enforcement action.”135 Along these lines,
commentators have noted that “[i]n Canada, only a single
[enforcement] case involving environmental disclosure was brought
bysecurities regulatorswithinaperiodof twenty-fiveyears”andhave
argued that this hashad the effect of softening regulatory compliance
and perpetuating the misconception that environmental/social
information is not material.136 While I sympathize with this
argument and would certainly advocate stronger enforcement
measures as a long-term strategy,137 I am not convinced that this is
the best way to proceed at the current juncture. For the present, I am
of the view that more is to be gained by a combination of rigorous
interpretative guidance and issue-specific monitoring/reviews of
continuous disclosure filings that focus on human rights-related
risks. Before proceeding tomore austere deterrence-basedmeasures,
more needs to be done in terms of assisting issuers to understand the
nature of their continuous disclosure obligations with respect to
social information. This approach is in harmony with the
compliance-based strategy most recently (and persuasively)
recommended by Professor Condon138 and the growing body of
135. CICA, “Financial Reporting Disclosures”, supra, footnote 38, at p. 29. See also
National Round Table, “Capital Markets and Sustainability”, supra, footnote 92,
at p. 32 (“Recommendation 5.4[:] That securities regulators . . . when required,
enforce the [environmental, social and governance] disclosure requirement”).
136. Repetto, “Silence is Golden”, supra, footnote 22, at p. 21. See also Robert
Repetto, Andrew MacSkimming and Gustavo Carvajal Isunza, “Environmental
Disclosure Requirements in the Securities Regulations and Financial Accounting
Standards of Canada, Mexico and the United States” (March 25, 2002), at pp.
16-19, online: Commission for Environmental Cooperation 5http://www.ce-
c.org4 (discussing Sheridan (Re) (1993), 16 O.S.C.B. 6345). The argument for
more robust forms of enforcement engages the systemic problems associated with
capital markets enforcement in Canada. For a discussion of these issues, and
accompanying recommendations, see the Hon. Peter de C. Cory and Marilyn L.
Pilkington, “Critical Issues in Enforcement” (paper commissioned by the Task
Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, September 2006), online:
Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada 5http://
www.tfmsl.ca4.
137. See Condon, Anand and Sarra, Securities Law in Canada, supra, footnote 46, at
p. 372 (“Even with codification, there will . . . be issuers who use any malleability
or lack of clarity in reporting requirements to shirk their obligations . . . Hence,
enforcement . . . is essential to the integrity of the system”).
138. Mary Condon, “Rethinking Enforcement and Litigation in Ontario Securities
Regulation” (2006), 32 Queen’s L.J. 1 at pp. 5 and 42 (“in order to be more
effective, deterrence-based enforcement efforts, such as after-the-fact sanctioning,
should be re-oriented towards strategies for developing ‘compliance cultures’
within market participants”; “[w]ith respect to public enforcement of securities
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law and society work that questions the efficacy of enforcement
motivated by deterrence aims.139
5. Education on the Materiality of Social
Information to Firm Valuation
Fifth, and finally, securities regulators should work in
collaboration with interested stakeholders (e.g., both levels of
government, the CICA, civil society organizations etc.) to design a
program that will educate Canadian companies on themateriality of
social information to firm valuation.140 It is clear that a widespread
connection has not yet beenmade bymembers of industry. Consider
the following comments of theCanadianBankersAssociation,made
when NI 51-102 was in its developmental stages and feedback on the
instrument was being solicited:
The proposed AIF requirements deal with disclosing an issuer’s social and
environmental policies. The Purpose of such disclosure is unclear . . . Since
information in the AIF is generally of a financial, operational and governance
nature, the requirement inappropriately expands the scope of the AIF.
Additional non-material information should not be required disclosure in a
document such as the AIF . . .141
In order to adequately advance this recommendation, it is
necessary to take a step back for a moment and to consider the
concept ofmateriality in its broader context.Materiality is central to
securities regulation as it is the standard that facilitates a
determination of what information must be disclosed by a public
corporation.142 It is broadly recognized that in order to make
informed decisions regarding equity investment, investors should
have available to them all material information.143 Internationally,
themajorityof (andperhapsall) publicmarkets aredisclosure-based.
This design permits the issuance and trading of securities only if the
law by the OSC, I argue that there is insufficient evidence that deterrence is an
effective regulatory strategy to justify the weight that is currently placed on it in
sanctioning, at both the administrative and criminal levels”).
139. See the discussion in Condon, ibid., at pp. 30-34 and, in particular, note 33 (“a
more specific set of regulatory requirements and/or more pervasive monitoring
by regulatory agents is required to reorient the ‘culture’ of such firms”).
140. National Round Table, “Capital Markets and Sustainability”, supra, footnote 92,
at p. 32.
141. Letter of the Canadian Bankers Association to provincial regulators (August 27,
2003), online: Ontario Securities Commission 5http://www.osc.gov.on.ca4
(emphasis added).
142. Condon, Anand and Sarra, Securities Law in Canada, supra, footnote 46, at p.
224.
143. Repetto et al., “Environmental Disclosure Requirements”, supra, footnote 136, at
p. 1.
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issuing company has met transparency requirements.144 The
disclosure of such information is integral to shielding investors
from fraud and to capital markets efficiency. Information
asymmetries may result in the incorrect pricing of securities and the
practice of incomplete disclosuremay serve to cloakmalfeasance.145
Using material information, markets must be able to adequately
express firm exposures as an evaluation of economic risk and
value.146
Materiality — and, specifically, what should be characterized as
material information, material fact and material change — has
particular importance vis-à-vis prospectus requirements.147 But it is
also a foundational notion in the continuous disclosure regime,most
notably in the context of a reporting issuer’s obligation to disclose
material changes in theaffairsof itsbusiness.148Most importantly for
present purposes, Forms 51-102F1 and 51-102F2 advise issuers to
include in the MD&A and AIF only material information,149 which is
defined in both documents as follows: “[w]ould a reasonable
investor’s decision whether or not to buy, sell or hold securities in
your company likely be influenced or changed if the information in
question was omitted or misstated? If so, the information is likely
material.”150
There is no objectivemeasure for establishingmateriality— it is a
social construction, shaped by socio-economic context.151 In that
regard, it is noteworthy that both Forms articulate a “reasonable
investor test” for determining materiality (in harmony with the U.S.
approach), rather than a “market impact test” which is routinely
applied in provincial securities legislation outside of Quebec.152 The
144. Sarra, “Disclosure as a Public Policy Instrument”, supra, footnote 30, at p. 876.
145. Repetto et. al., “Environmental Disclosure Requirements”, supra, footnote 136,
at p. 1.
146. Repetto, “Silence is Golden”, supra, footnote 22, at p. 16.
147. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Five Year Review Committee,
Final Report, supra, footnote 8, at pp. 142ff.
148. NI 51-102 Consolidation, supra, footnote 33, at p. 40, s. 7.1.
149. 51-102F1, supra, footnote 47, at p. 82, part 1(e); Form 51-102F2, supra, footnote
61, at p. 98, part 1(d).
150. 51-102F1, ibid., at p. 82, part 1(f); Form 51-102F2, ibid., at p. 99, part 1(e). The
CICA guidance document recommends that “[m]anagement should resolve any
doubt about materiality in favour of disclosure”. See CICA, “Management’s
Discussion and Analysis: Guidance on Preparation and Disclosure” as cited in
CICA, “Financial Reporting Disclosures”, supra, footnote 38, at p. 16.
151. Margaret V. Sachs, “Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing ‘the
Reasonable Investor’ with ‘the Least Sophisticated Investor’ in Inefficient
Markets” (2006), 81 Tul. L. Rev. 473 at p. 483 (“Different eras have given rise to
different standards of materiality”).
152. Five Year Review Committee, Final Report, supra, footnote 8, at p. 148.
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latter test is exemplifiedbythedefinitionof“material fact” ins.1(1)of
the OSA: “a fact that would reasonably be expected to have a
significant effect on the market price or value of the securities.”153
There is, of course, the potential for significant overlap between the
two tests. A reasonable investor’s decisionwhether or not to buy, sell
or hold securities (i.e., the reasonable investor test, applicable to the
MD&A and AIF) will invariably be influenced by whether the relevant
information will have a significant effect on the value of the security
(i.e., the market impact test). However, it can also be argued that the
reasonable investor test is distinguishable from the market impact
test because it opens the door to considering information that may
notbedirectly linkedwith the security’smarketvalue.The former test
has the potential to engage the investment decision-making process
outside of the traditional contours ofmarket price— in otherwords,
outside of the realm of rational choice theory that characterizes the
neoclassical economic paradigm and into the realm of “irrational”
factors thatmay informan investmentdecisionandareaccounted for
under a behavioral finance approach.154
It is tempting to advocate in favour of sustainability reporting as a
function of the arguably more broad reasonable investor test that
accompanies the MD&A and AIF. My preference, however, is to be
more cautious. Even if we assume a more rigid test (i.e., one that
equates a reasonable investor’s decision solely with value
maximization), there is a growing body of literature establishing a
nexus between a firm’s social performance and its profitability, thus
bringing social information under the umbrella of materiality. The
reportingof social informationshouldbeviewedasan integralpartof
a business’ overall riskmanagement strategy.With this information,
shareholders are in a better position to assess pecuniary risks and to
allocate capital to firms that are best suited to mitigate these risks.
Consider environmental and human rights-related information as
examples:
153. OSA, supra, footnote 8, s. 1(1).
154. See, for example, John R. Nofsinger, The Psychology of Investing, 3rd ed. (Upper
Saddle River, NJ, Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007). Over 30 years ago, Amartya Sen
offered a biting critique of traditional economic theory’s reductionist account of
human behavior: “The purely economic man is indeed close to being a social
moron. Economic theory has been much preoccupied with this rational fool
decked in the glory of his one all-purpose preference ordering. To make room for
the different concepts related to his behavior we need a more elaborate
structure.” See Amartya K. Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory” (1977), 6 Philosophy & Public Affairs 317 at
p. 336 (emphasis in original).
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Such information is crucial for investors because the value of securities
depends on the stream of future returns and their riskiness. In many industries,
future returns and risks are significantly affected by environmental exposures.
Because these are inadequately disclosed and analyzed, investors often suffer
sudden and significant losses when those risks materialize. Most of these
occurrences were the culmination of environmental exposures and risks that
existed beforehand but were not disclosed and were not understood by
investors, who consequently suffered serious losses.155
. . . . .
[C]orporations which violate human rights face higher insurance costs,
lawsuits in tort and the risk of paying settlements or damages payments.
Human rights abuse creates a riskier political climate which can cause
rioting, leading to destruction of corporate property and the possible
nationalization of business assets. Such risks are not just intolerable to
individual investors; they also poison the capital market generally and
discourage efficient capital formation. Companies which violate human
rights laws risk investors’ assets for questionable gains. They seek to
externalize costs resulting in diseconomies to the detriment of the market.
Given these concrete economic costs, investors have a right to know about
the labor, environmental, and human rights practices of their company.156
Along these lines, two recent and relevant U.S. examples include
the operations of Chevron in the Ecuadorian Amazon and those of
Dow Chemical in India. Non-governmental organization Amazon
Watch has accused Chevron of providing insufficient disclosure and
misrepresenting material information regarding a possible $10
billion liability that stems from oil-related environmental litigation
pursuedbyAmazonresidents inEcuador. It has furtherasked the SEC
to impose sanctions on the corporation.157 Further, Amnesty
International has alleged that Dow has not disclosed information
relating to its belief that pending legal liabilities regarding theBhopal
chemical disaster are an impediment to the company’s continued
expansion inIndia.158Correspondingly, ithasaskedtheSECto launch
an official investigation.
Returning to the substance of recommendation five, in
establishing an educative program for reporting issuers on the
155. Repetto, “Silence is Golden”, supra, footnote 22, at p. 19.
156. Eric Engle, “What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Human Rights, Shareholder
Activism and SEC Reporting Requirements” (2006), 57 Syracuse L. Rev. 63 at p.
66.
157. See “SEC Complaint Lodged against Chevron for Hiding $10 Billion Liability in
Ecuador” (March 26, 2008), online: Amazon Watch 5http://amazonwatch.-
org4.
158. See “Amnesty International Seeks SEC Investigation of Dow Chemical” (April 12,
2007), online: Amnesty International USA 5http://www.amnestyusa.org4
(“Looking at these letters, it seems that Dow’s refusal to address the human
rights of the Bhopal survivors may be having a serious, but undisclosed, financial
impact”).
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materiality of information that has not historically been
characterized as such, it will be essential to expose issuers to
compelling, persuasive research. I have canvassed some of the
relevant academic literature elsewhere159 and will nowmention only
three recent (and related) United Nations studies. In 2004, the Asset
Management Working Group of the United Nations Environment
ProgrammeFinance Initiative (UNEPFI) published a groundbreaking
study titled “The Materiality of Social, Environmental and
Corporate Governance Issues to Equity Pricing”. Eleven reports
from nine brokerage houses were produced for the study, which
analyzed the materiality of environmental, social and corporate
governance (ESG) factors to corporate reputation and
competitiveness in seven industry sectors. Each report found that
ESG considerations have an impact on long-term shareholder value,
sometimes at a profound level.160 Most importantly for present
purposes, as a result of the findings theUNEPFI encouraged regulators
to “[u]pdate their regulations of . . . financial materiality to include
consideration of material environmental, social and corporate
governance issues . . . [and] [u]pdate financial disclosure regulations
for companies and stock exchanges to require specific disclosure of
environmental, social and corporate governance criteria.”161
Interestingly, no Canadian or U.S. brokerage houses agreed to
participate in the study, citing, among other things, problems with
159. See Aaron A. Dhir, “Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder
Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights
Accountability” (2006), 43 American Business Law Journal 365 at pp. 371-73 and
Aaron A. Dhir, “Of Takeovers, Foreign Investment and Human Rights:
Unpacking the Noranda-Minmetals Conundrum” (2006), 22 Banking and
Finance Law Review 77 at pp. 96-99. See also: Conference Board of Canada,
“The Role of the Board of Directors in Corporate Social Responsibility” (June
2008) at p. 11 (citation omitted) (“The CSR business case documented in the
literature includes enhanced reputation, improved brand equity, minimized
operational risks, improved productivity, ability to attract and retain talent,
greater efficiency, enhanced customer and regulator relations, improved access to
capital, broadened social licence to operate, increased innovation, and overall
enhanced competitive positioning. Much research to date highlights the growing
view that CSR issues are material to a company’s bottom line . . .”); the studies
referenced by Herremans et al., supra, footnote 132, at p. 9 (“up to 50 percent of a
traditional company’s value . . . can be determined by assessing . . . non-financial
factors”); the studies referenced in David Hess, “Public Pensions and the Promise
of Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier of Corporate Governance:
Sustainable Economic Development” (2007), 2 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 221 at p. 229,
n. 41; and Yaron, supra, footnote 83, at pp. 12-13.
160. UNEPFI, “The Materiality of Social, Environmental and Corporate Governance
Issues to Equity Pricing” (June 2004) at p. 4, online: UNEPFI 5http://
www.unepfi.org4.
161. Ibid., at p. 5.
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data analysis due to barriers preventing sufficient disclosure of these
factors (i.e., we cannot participate in a study to address social
disclosure because the information is not available due to perceived
governmental/regulatory encumbrances).162
In 2005, Freshfields BruckhausDeringer (Freshfields) produced a
report for the UNEPFI that considered the fiduciary duties of trustees
with respect to institutional investment funds. Specifically, the
UNEPFI asked Freshfields to consider whether incorporating ESG
factors into investment decision-making (e.g., portfolio
construction, asset allocation, stock-picking) is “voluntarily
permitted, legally required or hampered by law and regulation.”163
In reviewing sevenmajor jurisdictions (both common and civil law),
the report concluded as follows:
In our view, decision-makers are required to have regard (at some level) to
ESG considerations in every decision they make. This is because there is a
body of credible evidence demonstrating that such considerations often have
a role to play in the proper analysis of investment value. As such they cannot
be ignored, because doing so may result in investments being given an
inappropriate value.
. . . . .
. . . [T]he links between ESG factors and financial performance are
increasingly being recognised. On that basis, integrating ESG considerations
into an investment analysis so as to more reliably predict financial
performance is clearly permissible and is arguably required in all jurisdic-
tions.164
Finally, building on the first two studies, in a 2006 report the
UNEPFI further analyzed the relevance of ESG metrics to firm
valuation. It found “robust evidence” that such metrics impact
longand short-termshareholder valuebothpositively andnegatively
and that this impact can be measured using a spectrum of valuation
tools. The findings were the result of analysis conducted by
“established financial analysts” and were supported by an arms-
length investment consultant.165
162. Ibid., at p. 8.
163. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, “A Legal Framework for the Integration of
Environmental, Social and Governance Issues into Institutional Investment”
(October 2005) at p. 6, online: UNEPFI 5http://www.unepfi.org4.
164. Ibid., at pp. 10, 11 and 13 (emphasis in original).
165. UNEPFI, “Show Me the Money: Linking Environmental, Social and Governance
Issues to Company Value” (2006) at p. 11, online: UNEPFI 5http://www.unep-
fi.org4. In addition to studies establishing a correlation between social and
economic performance, other bodies of literature will be a useful addition to any
educative program. For example, the global not-for-profit AccountAbility has
offered a framework/methodology for assisting businesses in identifying and
evaluatingmaterial sustainability-related considerations.SeeAccountAbility, “The
Materiality Report” (November 2006) at pp. 31ff, online: AccountAbility5http://
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Before closing this section, I should note that any educative
programfor reporting issuers shouldalso involve a candiddiscussion
of industry concernswithmanaging associated costs. “[D]isclosure is
not costless”166 and strengthening social disclosure will certainly
trigger additional expenditures in terms of information production
and verification. Given the literature establishing a connection
between firm social and financial performance, it is increasingly
difficult to argue that this disclosure will be relevant to only a small,
select group of investors (and thus that the costs are not justified).
Further, it should be noted that sustainability reporting has the
potential to yield various financial benefits. For example, gains
arising from strengthened ties with significant end purchasers,
suppliers and workers; a more nuanced comprehension of possible
liabilities;167 decreased insurance and debt financing costs;168 less
shareprice fluctuation;169andachievingsocietal licence foroperating
practices/enhanced reputational capital. Thus, “[f]rom a corporate
strategy perspective, the costs . . . may not be considered costs at all,
but rather an investment with returns paid in several different
forms.”170 That having been said, following the U.K. approach,
limits might be placed on which firms must provide such disclosure
www.accountability21.net4. See also SimonZadek andMiraMerme, “Redefining
Materiality: Practice and Public Policy for Effective Corporate Reporting” (July
2003), online: AccountAbility, 5http://www.accountability21.net4 (advancing
four proposals for the implementation of a redefined conception of materiality).
Further, in the Canadian context, Denstedt and Miller offer excellent practical
advice on the process of conducting an environmental due diligence review in
order to ensure that material information is not omitted. See Denstedt and
Miller, supra, footnote 80, at p. 19ff.
166. Anita I. Anand, “An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Govern-
ance: Structures Post-Sarbanes-Oxley” (2006), 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 229 at p. 248.
167. Hess, “Social Reporting”, supra, footnote 6, at p. 81.
168. Yaron, supra, footnote 83, at p. 18.
169. Allen L. White, “New Wine, New Bottles: The Rise of Non-Financial Reporting”
(June 20, 2005) at p. 3, online: GRI 5http://www.globalreporting.org4 (citation
omitted).
170. Hess, “Social Reporting”, supra, footnote 6, at p. 81. For an exploration of the
relationship between social disclosure and market reaction in the United
Kingdom, see Alan Murray et al., “Do Financial Markets Care about Social
and Environmental Disclosure?” (2006), 19 Accounting, Auditing & Account-
ability Journal 228 at pp. 245-46: “The most important [result] was that, over a
period of time, total social and environmental disclosure is significantly related to
market returns even after adjusting for the size effect . . . we can conclude that
companies . . . with consistently lower returns are likely to have consistently lower
levels of total and voluntary social and environmental disclosure . . . Equally,
companies with consistently higher returns are likely to have consistently higher
levels of total and voluntary social and environmental disclosure . . . On the
evidence . . . we cannot infer that such disclosures are wastefulness on the part of
management, which are ignored or discounted by the market.”
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according to size/market capitalization (i.e., in order to protect
smaller issuers).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite the lack of explicit provisions, there is undoubtedly
sufficient basis to compel the reporting of material sustainability-
related information under Canadian securities law. However,
various weaknesses exist in the legal framework. These weaknesses,
coupled with how the existing law has been interpreted, stifle the
potential of existing provisions. In this paper, I have offered a set of
recommendations that I hope will strengthen the legal regime.Many
importantquestions remain.Forexample,whencompanyofficersgo
through theprocessof determiningwhat information ismaterial they
are exercising their discretion, which is to be informed by legal
standards. What exactly is the relationship between these decisions
regardingdisclosure and thebusiness judgment rule?171Doadequate
procedures exist for the external, independent verification of
reported social information? While “[t]here are authoritative
interpretations of accounting standards [regarding] the correct
accounting treatment . . . of many environmental issues,”172
accounting practices vis-à-vis other ethical/social issues are still
evolving.173 Will this development proceed in a satisfactory manner
onlyasaresultofenhancedmandatorydisclosure?174Shouldtherebe
aheightenedrole fornon-governmentalorganizations in theauditing
171. The content and application of the business judgment rule is a somewhat nuanced
issue. At a general level, it is understood as the principle that courts should afford
deference to the business decisions of corporate directors and officers. See
Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 at para.
64, 244 D.L.R. (4th) 564. The Supreme Court of Canada recently stated that the
business judgment rule does not apply in ascertaining whether a corporation has
met its disclosure obligations under the OSA. Disclosure, it wrote, is an issue of
legal obligation, not business judgment. See Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., [2007] 3
S.C.R. 331 at paras. 54-58, 286 D.L.R. (4th) 601. Arguably, however, this
statement was in obiter as strictly speaking the court did not need to entertain this
issue.
172. CICA, “Financial Reporting Disclosures”, supra, footnote 38, at p. 11.
173. Ibid., at p. 12, n. 10. See also David L. Owen and Brendan O’Dwyer, “Corporate
Social Responsibility: The Reporting and Assurance Dimension” in Andrew
Crane et al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 384 at pp. 403-404 (“The . . . studies
considered . . . suggest that sustainability assurance practice is characterized by
inconsistencies in approach [However,] [s]ome hope for improvement is offered
by ongoing attempts to develop comprehensive assurance standards that combine
the procedural and presentational rigor of ISAE 3000 with the emphasis on
stakeholder responsiveness of AA1000 . . .”).
174. As suggested by Yaron, supra, footnote 83, at p. 17.
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process?175 Is there a risk of “informational overload,” where an
overabundance of material may result in detrimental effects,
including decisions of poor quality?176
Theseare someof thequestions thatwillneedtobe furtherengaged
as regulators progress in addressing potential information
asymmetries by strengthening Canada’s disclosure regime. A recent
survey ofCanadian businesses suggests that firms are demonstrating
a marked improvement in reporting to investors on corporate
governance issues.177 It is hoped that social disclosurewill be the next
step in this trend.
175. As suggested, for example, by the European Coalition for Corporate Justice. See
European Coalition for Corporate Justice, “Fair Law: Legal Proposals to
Improve Corporate Accountability for Environmental and Human Rights
Abuses” (May 29, 2008) at p. 32, online: ECCJ 5http://www.corporatejusti-
ce.org4.
176. Paula J. Dalley, “The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System”
(2007), 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1089 at p. 1115.
177. Janet Mcfarland, “Business Gets Better at the Business of Disclosure”, The Globe
& Mail, November 26, 2007, online: Globe & Mail 5www.theglobeandmail.-
com4.
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